The licensing of occupations often is accused of being stealth regulation that operates under the public policy radar screen. Unlike other labor market institutions, such as laws regulating unions or the minimum wage, the regulation of occupations has received little attention by the press, academics, or policymakers. However, this lack of attention is not because occupational licensing is diminishing in the labor market. Figure 1 shows that the growth of occupational licensing in the United States has increased far more than unions, a more widely studied labor market institution. Since the 1950s, licensing coverage has grown from about 5 percent of the workforce to more than 20 percent, while unions have declined from about a third of the workforce to less than 13 percent, and to fewer than 8 percent in the private sector. Approximately 50 occupations are licensed in all states, and about 800 occupations are similarly regulated in at least one state.
Occupational regulation has varying levels of stringency. The toughest form of regulation is licensure, where it is illegal for a person to practice a profession without first meeting state standards, which usually involve detailed education requirements, testimonials of "good SOURCE: Tabulations for licensing coverage for the 1950s are from the Council of State Governments (1952) , which lists licensed occupations in the public use Census Sample for 1950. For the 1960s, the tabulations are from Greene (1969) , which links the available listing of licensed occupations to census tabulations. The data for the 1980s are from Kleiner (1990) tabulations; new estimates were developed for 2000. Estimates for union density are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1979) and Hirsch and Macpherson (2005) . 
Potential benefits of licensing
Increased standardization of services and reduction in the potential "loss aversion" by consumers due to poor quality service.
Evidence of the benefits of licensing Some evidence that the insured and higher-income gain from stricter licensing but no measurable impact on overall quality.
Price and wage effects of licensing Licensing drives up prices, and the overall wage effect relative to unlicensed occupations in cross-section data is 10-12 percent, but impacts differ widely based on methods, occupations, and toughness of restrictions.
Licensing and employment growth
Within an occupation, the percentage employment growth rate is approximately 20 percent greater in states that do not require licensing, but impacts differ widely based on the methods and occupations.
State variations in licensing
Much variation in the number of occupations licensed by states and the percent of the workforce covered by licensing laws. Case studies show that political spending by the occupational associations is an important factor for who gets regulated.
Redistribution and lost output due to licensing
Estimated redistribution effects to regulated occupations of between $116 billion and $139 billion in 2000 dollars, and lost output of $34.8 and $41.7 billion per year, which is less than 0.1 percent of total consumption expenditures.
U.S. and EU comparisons
Both economies regulate entry but there is often no exam beyond university or trade school to obtain a license for many of the professions in the EU. EU nations regulate prices charged and the organizational structure of the professions to a greater extent than the United States. Wage effects for licensing are around 1 percent using cross-section estimates, but the impacts vary widely based on methods, occupations, and toughness of restrictions. Although the regulation of individuals in occupations dates to ancient times, the guilds of medieval Europe are most often mentioned as examples of the imposition of tough restrictions on entering a craft or occupation. In the United States through much of the nineteenth century, few restrictions were imposed on occupations we often think of as licensed, such as doctors and lawyers. During the past 50 years, however, with the increase in complexity of jobs, especially in the service sector, licensing of individuals in their jobs emerged as one of the fastestgrowing labor market institutions in the United States and other industrialized nations.
One of the major justifications for occupational licensing is that it increases service quality. Yet the available studies offer little evidence that licensing individuals has an impact on the quality of service received by consumers. For example, my examination of data from Wisconsin and Minnesota finds no evidence of differences in consumer complaints between Wisconsin, which licensed certain health care occupations, such as physical therapists, respiratory care providers, and physician assistants, and complaints to state boards in Minnesota, which certified the same occupations.
Malpractice insurance premiums can also serve as the arbitrator of the effectiveness of licensing as a way to mitigate the harmful effects of inept practitioners. If licensing works as intended, it should reduce mistakes by licensed relative to unlicensed practitioners. The insurance industry would then provide lower premiums for practitioners in regulated states because licensing statutes (such as testing and background checks) would have weeded out incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners. However, my examination of the rates charged nationally for practitioners who are licensed in some U.S. states and not in others reveals that no price breaks on malpractice in insurance premiums were given to practitioners in licensed states.
Then what are the potential impacts of licensing? Restricting labor supply is one. For example, there was a decline in employment growth for librarians, respiratory therapists, and dietitians and nutritionists from 1990 to 2000 in those states that regulate these occupations relative those that do not. The estimates using census data show that, for the licensed occupations that were regulated in about one-half of all states, licensing reduced the percentage growth rate of employment by a statistically significant 20 percent. Therefore, it is not surprising that the impact of licensing on hourly earnings compared to similar unlicensed occupations was about 10-17 percent, depending on the occupations and the methods used in the analysis.
There is considerable variation among the states in the number of occupations licensed and in the percentage of the workforce that is covered by licensing laws. For example, California licenses almost 180 occupations that cover more than 30 percent of its workforce. On the other hand, Kansas licenses about 50 occupations, and these regulatory laws cover less than 12 percent of its workforce. If licensing has no productivity impacts yet increases spending, then simulations of the net expenses of the labor market regulation indicate it costs the economy about $38 billion in lost service output per year.
The regulation of occupations in Europe takes a somewhat different form from that in the United States. Rather than focusing on postgraduation tests, countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom tend to regulate the prices charged and the organizational structure that is allowed by practitioners. With the smaller differences in the wage structure in Europe and the way occupations are licensed, the overall impact of licensing on hourly wages is much smaller than in the United States.
The major empirical findings in Licensing Occupations are summarized in Table 1 . Given these results of the labor market impacts of licensing, other forms of regulation, such as certification, are suggested. Alternative forms of occupational regulation may provide consumers with more choice than licensing and reduce the potential monopoly impacts of licensing in the labor market. In order to better monitor the economic impacts of licensing, data on this form of regulation should be provided to academics and policymakers in the major national labor market data sources, such as the Current Population Survey. With more data and analysis, the public, workers, and policymakers can more accurately assess whether occupational licensing is ensuring quality or restricting competition.
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Employment and Wage Effects of Privatization Evidence from Transition Economies
The greatest opposition to privatizing a firm usually comes from the firm's own employees, who are fearful of wage cuts and job losses. Workers' apprehensions about privatization are consistent with standard economic analyses, whereby new private owners reduce the firm's labor costs in response to harder budget constraints and stronger profit-related incentives. Discussions of this "efficiency effect" of privatization, however, implicitly assume that the firm's output remains constant or at least does not increase. But lower costs may increase the firm's market share as well as total quantity demanded for the industry, and the new private owners may be more entrepreneurial in marketing, innovation, and entering new markets. In such cases, the firm's output will tend to rise, and if this "scale effect" dominates, then privatization could cause a net employment increase.
The implications of privatization for wages are also ambiguous. New owners may reduce wages as part of a general cost-cutting policy, but if the firm expands, it may have to offer higher wages to attract new workers. New private owners may also be more likely to adopt skill-biased technologies, resulting in a compositional shift toward higher-paid workers. Depending on the relative strength of such factors, wages may either rise or fall as a result of privatization.
Not only does theoretical analysis fail to provide definitive predictions on the wage and employment effects of privatization, but also the existing empirical evidence is both scant and inconclusive, containing both negative and positive estimates of the effects on workers. Therefore, the Upjohn Institute, in collaboration with partners from Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and the Central European University Labor Project in Budapest, has recently undertaken an empirical analysis of the effects of privatization on the wage bill, employment, and wage rates of firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine-countries where thousands of businesses were privatized in a relatively short period of time during the 1990s. These four countries had varied success with privatization reforms. Hungary was considered one of the most successful, Russia and Ukraine were less successful, and Romania was somewhere in the middle. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average real wage bill and percent private ownership in each country. At this aggregate level of analysis, a strong negative correlation is evident in all four countries, which would seem to corroborate workers' fears and most economists' expectations. However, several other events that could affect the wage bill occurred during the 1990s (including macroeconomic shocks and market liberalization), and the firms selected for privatization may have been declining for extraneous reasons. To deal with these potentially confounding factors and estimate the causal effects of privatization on workers, the project has analyzed microdata on firms that have been linked over time. The methods applied to estimate the privatization effects at the firm level draw upon some of those used in evaluations of labor market training programs in the United States.
Privatization Programs and Implications for Workers
The methods and tempos of large enterprise privatization differed quite significantly across the four countries in this study. Hungary got off to an early start in ownership transformation and maintained a consistent case-by-case
